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A b s tr a c t
During much of the post WW1I experience U.S. monetary policy has been con­
ducted in such a way as to eliminate seasonal fluctuations in prices and/or nominal 
interest rates. Developments in financial markets and recently discovered empirical 
regularities regarding the seasonal cycle seem to make these activities questionable. 
Using a general equilibrium money-in-the-utility function model this paper analyzes 
the welfare properties of price and interest rate stabilizing policies and examines the 
sense in which the distinction between seasonal and cyclical fluctuations is relevant 
for policy purposes. It is shown that price and interest rate smoothing policies are 
welfare improving, but they are not optimal and that the origin of shocks, not the 
persistence of the fluctuations, is relevant in formulating policies.
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For much of the post WWII experience it has been common practice for the U.S. monetary 
authorities to react to seasonal variations in the demand for money and credit in such a way 
as to keep the price level and nominal interest rates relatively free of seasonal fluctuations. 
Pursuing these seasonal activities was motivated in the earlier part of the century by the 
perceived connection between seasonal movements in interest rates and banking panics 
(see Kemmerer (1910), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Miron (1986) and Canova (1991) 
among others). However, after the FDIC began insuring commercial bank deposits in 
1934, there seems little reason to have continued this practice since the apparent link 
between seasonals and banking panics was severed.
Some justifications for continuing these seasonal activities exist in the current liter­
ature. For example, Poole and Lieberman (1972) claim that the elimination of seasonality 
in nominal interest rates arising from seasonal fluctuations in money demand (as opposed 
to seasonal movements in aggregate demand) achieves an efficient allocation of resources. 
Goodfriend (1987) argues that central banks regard price instability as costly because of 
a Lucas (1972) aggregate supply effect. He reassesses the idea that central banks care 
about interest rate instability because of potential threats to the financial system. In 
Barro (1989) nominal interest rate smoothing is desirable for the same reasons cited by 
Goodfriend.
Earlier work by Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 295) also suggested that a price 
smoothing policy, following seasonal movements in the money demand to output ratio, 
is “perhaps desirable” since there are seasons when the community desires smaller real 
balances relative to income at any given interest rate. However more recently Friedman 
(1982, b, p. 406) contends that:
Even if the seasonal in the demand function were known, it is by no means
obvious that there is any social gain from the Fed’s offsetting it. After all, the
markets are well equipped to handle regular seasonals.
In discussing the formulation of price smoothing policies, Friedman and Schwartz 
also stressed the distinction between seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in the money de­
mand to output ratio. They claim that the proper price smoothing response depends on 
which of the two cycles is present in the economy (p. 295). Barsky and Miron (1989) 
implicitly question this distinction by demonstrating the existence of several statistical 
similarities between what they call the “seasonal" and the “business” cycle. In particu­
lar their analysis reveals that several real variables (output in particular) possess similar 
features at seasonal and business cycle frequencies. Therefore Friedman and Schwartz’s 
distinction seems appropriate only if cyclical shocks affect money demand differently than 
seasonal shocks.
In this paper I analyze the welfare implications of price and interest rate smoothing 
policies and examine whether the distinction between seasonal and cyclical shocks matters 
in the formulation of smoothing policies. The exercises are conducted in the context of 
a money-in-the-utility (MIUF) model similar to the one employed by LeRoy (1984,a) 
and (1984,b) and Danthine and Donaldson (1986). While these studies emphasized the 
effect of certain shocks on commodity and asset prices, this paper concentrates primarily 




























































































shocks. Although other attempts to assess the welfare implications of alternative govern­
ment portfolios exist in the literature (e.g., Sargent and Wallace (1982), Wallace (1988)), 
the analysis so far has been restricted to deterministic environments.
The model considered includes money and one additional asset which dominates 
money in rate of return. This additional asset is included because it is widely recognized 
that alternative government portfolios may be neutral if no rate of return dominance 
exists (see Wallace (1981), Chamley and Polemarchakis (1985), Sargent and Smith (1987) 
and Gottardi (1988)). Also, contrary to both Barro and Goodfriend which describe simple 
choices for money supply paths, I examine a class of open market price smoothing policies. 
This approach has the advantage of more closely resembling the policies employed by the 
Fed in the Post WWII era. The policies considered have real affects because they influence 
either the level of real cash balances or their rate of return1.
The way money is incorporated in a general equilibrium model is still a controversial 
issue in monetary theory (see Danthine and Donaldson (1986) for a discussion and refer­
ences). Since the results may depend on the framework of analysis used, the paper also 
discusses the robustness of the welfare conclusions and of the seasonal/cyclical distinction 
using two alternative specifications (a cash-in-advance and an overlapping generations 
model).
The paper demonstrates that in a MIUF model smoothing policies can be welfare 
improving but they are not optimal (see also Friedman (1969, p. 46-48)). Since at an 
optimum the return of money must fluctuate with the state of the economy, it is not clear 
why smoothing policies have received more attention in practice than policies attempting 
to drive the economy toward optimality. As far as the distinction between seasonal and 
cyclical fluctuations is concerned, it is shown that the design of welfare improving policies 
may depend on the origin of the shocks but not on the structure of their transition matrix 
(i.e. the persistence of the fluctuations). Finally, the paper shows that these conclusions 
are robust both to alternative ways of introducing money in the economy and to the life 
span of the agents in the economy but that they may be altered in an environment where 
agents are heterogeneous.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the MIUF 
model, computes the equilibria for a set of benchmark policies and examines the response 
of the price level and of the interest rate to two types of shocks. Section 3 discusses the 
relevance of the distinction between seasonal and cyclical fluctuations. Section 4 considers 
the welfare properties of a class of smoothing policies. Section 5 examines the robustness 
of the results to alternative ways of introducing money in the economy. Section 6 contains 
the conclusions.
2 The M odel
There are two agents in the economy: a representative consumer who derives utility from 
consumption and real cash balances and saves using money or government bonds and a 
government that finances current deficits with an inflation tax and bond issues.
'Although it has been argued that the ability of monetary policy to affect real variables through 
these channels may be quantitatively unimportant, alternative model specifications with more 




























































































There is one perishable good in the economy and agents receive a random endowment 
x( of it each period. There are two nominal assets in the model: money Aft and a one- 
period bond with face value Bt. The price of money in terms of consumption is pt and 
the price of a default free bond paying one unit of currency at maturity is St. Then, the 
gross nominal interest rate on risk free bonds is which is a known quantity at t.
The government is composed of two distinct authorities. A fiscal authority that 
exogenously produces a net-of-interest deficit Dt = Gt — T, and a monetary authority 
which takes Dt as given and finances it subject to the constraint:
Dt = m{ -  m?.,*,-! + fcf -  ftj-in-! (1)
Here m* =  M ‘+ipt and b‘ =  B ‘+tPtSt; x t-i =  ;g the gross real return on currency and 
r‘- i  =  3777 “  the gross real return on bonds. At time 1 the finance constraint is given by:
D l = m ‘i + b ‘l - P l*(M5 +  B i) (2)
The representative consumer maximizes:
E o f^ 0 tU(ct ,m t ,tt)  (3)
t=o
where tt  is a preference shock and 0 <  0  <  1 is a discount factor. The constraint she faces 
is:
ci +  mt +  bt <  x t +  mt_iir(_i +  6t_ ir(_i c( >  0; mt >  0 Vt (4)
The time t choice variables for the consumer are ctl m(,bt. Let Wt =  mt_ i7r(_i +  6t_ 1 rt_ L 
be the financial wealth available to agents at the beginning of time t and let {i =  (x(, t t) be 
the realization of a two state Markov chain, with 00 > x* >  x t >  0 and 00 > £ / ,> £ * >  0 
and time invariant transition function:
P (it =  616-1 = fe )  =  n u )  (5)
'V(i,j) is assumed to induce a unique time invariant measure on which describes the 
long run (average) behavior of the process and has the following properties:
Assumption 1: 1 >  * ( i , j )  >  0, Vi, j;  *(»,;') =  1 .
The individual decision problem can be cast into a dynamic programming framework by 
defining Z as the maximum expected utility obtainable by a consumer who begins the 
period with Wt when the states of the economy are (f(, Dt, M ‘+ i,Bf+ l) and the prices are 
Pt and 5 |. Such a function, if it exists, satisfies:
Z ( W ,( ,D , \ r ,B ’) =  max U(c,m ,e) +  0 E Z (W ',{',D ',M " ,B " )  (6)
To insure the existence of a solution to the consumer’s problem we impose the following 
conditions:
Assumption £  There exist a m < 00 such that f/(ct,m ,£t) >  U(ct ,m t ,tt) ,  V m t 
and t/j(ct,m ,£t) =  0.
Assumption S: For all c(,m t € [0,m] and for fixed ef, is differentiable, in­




























































































oo as m, —► 0 for fixed ct and tt andAssumption 4- V(ct ,m ,,e t) =  -»
V (ct,m t,et) -+ 0 as c, —» 0 for fixed mt and tt.
Assumption 2 is innocuous. None of the results are altered if we let m -* oo. It is 
nevertheless useful since it facilitates the comparison with a cash-in-advance setup (see 
section 5) where there exists a natural upper bound to the value of real cash balances (see 
Wallace (1988)) and with previous work on optimal monetary growth (see e.g. Friedman 
(1969) and Abel (1987)). Assumptions 3 and 4 are standard (see e.g. Danthine-Donaldson 
(1986) or Wallace (1988)) and insure that the consumer’s indifference curves are well 
behaved. Under these assumptions the necessary and sufficient conditions for the consumer 
problem can be summarized by the following expression for the intratemporal marginal 
rate of substitution between ct and m t
V (ct,m t,£t) =  1 - 0Et[/i(ct+i,mt+i,£t+i)nt
U i(ct,m t,et)
= 1 -5 , (7)
Note that (7) embeds the notion of rate of return dominance for money. The 
marginal utility of holding real bonds, expressed in terms of expected marginal utility 
of consumption, exceeds the return on money (see Townsend (1987)). This anomaly arises 
because, in a monetary equilibrium and from the point of view of agents, the return on 
money must be augmented by the indirect yield obtained by loosening the liquidity con­
straint before it is compared with other assets. In the environment considered here there 
are potential profits to be made by appropriately intermediating between the two assets. 
Therefore, in general, different government portfolios will not be neutral.
2.1 Equilibrium
An equilibrium for the economy is defined as follows:
Definition: A competitive equilibrium is a collection of bounded sequences for the 
consumer choice variables (c,, m ,,6,), for prices (p, >  0, S, >  0) and government portfolio 
choices (A f^ ,, b ;+1) such that
•  (c ,,m ,,6,) solve (6).
•  satisfy (!)•
•  x, =  G, +  c,.
•  m, =  and 6, =  J9t>+1S1p1.
•  r, >  1, Vt and S, =
lb  compute the equilibrium for this economy we need to impose more structure on 
the activities of the government. The following assumption describes the conduct of the 
fiscal authorities and a benchmark policy employed by the monetary authority in manag­
ing the government portfolio.
Assumption 5: 0 <  Dt =  D < 6 Vt and for an appropriately chosen 6 ; M ‘+1 =  



























































































Assumption 5 allows us to concentrate entirely on the management of the govern­
ment portfolio (the fiscal deficit is constant) and restricts the activities of the monetary 
authority to be time and state independent. The money supply is allowed to grow or 
shrink as long as the composition of the government portfolio, denoted by 9, is unchanged 
over time. The condition Af<J +  Bg >  0 insures that p i is positive. Note that, given Mg 
and Bg, policy choices are fully described by the parameter 9. One obvious choice that 
satisfies all of these conditions is M ‘+l - Mg and 9 =  0.
Let p  =  and A =  • The conditional returns on money are given
by:
E(n\t =  h) =  
£(rr|t =  f) =
*(fc,fc) +  * ( M /*
1 +  T
*(/,< ) +  * (e ,h )p - 1
1 +  T (8)
Using (8), the feasibility condition, the restrictions appearing in assumption 4 and B ‘+1 =  
0 Vt, (7) can be written as:
V(xt -  D ,m t,e t )
V{xh -  D.ms.t/,)
+  *(*,*))
1 + T




The ratio of (9) to (10) implicitly defines a function <p(p). The equilibrium for the economy 
is given by a fixed point to p  =  <t>(p).
Proposition 1 ; There exists a unique fixed point to the equation p = <p{p). It is given 
by p* =  A-1 .
(The proofs of all propositions are in the appendix). The next proposition isolates the 
effect of each of the two shocks on the price level and on the nominal interest rate.
Proposition 2 : a) IfUn  >  (<) 0 and X* =  xt, then p’ > (<) 1 and Sh < (>) S(. 
b) I] t* =  £/, then p" < 1 and S* > S<.
An interpretation of part a) of this proposition is the following: if a high c implies stronger 
consumption desires for a given endowment and a high (low) e is realized, the representative 
consumer wishes to consume more (less) currently and cares less (more) about the future. 
In order to consume more (less) she attempts to liquidate (acquire) real balances. If the 
government follows state and time independent policies, the attempt to liquidate (acquire) 
real balances will push the price level and the nominal interest rate up (down)2. The 
restriction Un >  0 is satisfied for example for C/(ct,m t, et) =  c f1m fJ£“s with ati + 03+03 =  
1. Note that preferences disturbances are modelled here as “real” shocks. Note also that
aIt can be shown that when a intertemporal preference shock (a random 0 ) is used in place of
an intratemporal shock (a random e) with U 13 >  0 the result of propositions 1 and 2 still hold. 
This is trivially the case when shocks are i.i.d, but it also holds when serial dependence is allowed. 




























































































“teal” preference disturbances which have no effect on the marginal utility of consumption 
leave the price level and the nominal interest rates unchanged.
An interpretation of part b) of the proposition appears in both LeRoy (1984,b) and 
Danthine and Donaldson (1986) and it is only briefly summarized here. An unexpected 
high endowment requires that the level of teal money balances adjust to keep the service 
of money constant and the goods market in equilibrium. Since the price of money in 
terms of consumption adjusts procyclically to match movements in the marginal utility 
of consumption, the price level and the nominal interest rate will be low (high) when the 
endowment is high (low).
From proposition 2 it is immediate to note that the responses of the price level and 
the nominal interest rate are independent of the serial correlation properties of the shocks. 
This is a well known result for endowment shocks, but some explanations are required for 
the case of preference shocks. The serial correlation properties of real preference shocks 
do not matter here because they induce variations over time in the marginal utility of 
consumption. As in the case of endowment shocks, agents will have negative (positive) 
excess demand for real balances when the marginal utility of consumption is low (high) 
since changes in the marginal utility of consumption change the opportunity cost of holding 
money. Therefore preference disturbances of this type require adjustments both in the 
goods and in the money market and can not be classified as “sunk” costs in the terminology 
of LeRoy (1984,a).
One could also consider preference shocks that affect only the desire to hold nominal 
cash balances relative to income3. In this case adjustments will occur only in the money 
market. That is to say, for a given level of the real interest rate, the price level and the 
nominal interest rate will a4just to keep supply and demand for money in equilibrium. In 
this situation preference shocks will have features similar to money supply shocks. Since 
they do not affect the marginal utility of consumption, they are “sunk” costs and the serial 
correlation properties of the disturbances will matter for the equilibrium level of pt and 
St.
This type of shock is not considered in this paper because it implies some form of 
money illusion (there are times when identical amounts of nominal cash holdings yields a 
higher level of utility) on the part of agents which is difficult to justify in an optimizing 
framework with full information.
3 Seasonal and Cyclical Shocks
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) contend that it is important to distinguish between cyclical 
and seasonal fluctuations for policymaking. Barsky and Miron (1989) implicitly question 
this separation by showing substantial similarities between what they call the seasonal 
and the business cycle for several US variables.
In the present context we can distinguish cyclical and seasonal shocks in two ways: 
either in terms of their origin (preference or endowment shocks) or in terms of the mean
’This would be the case for example if =  f/i ( ft)+ M̂ 1 )■ Note also the difference
between this setup, where preference shocks affect nominal balances, and the case U i3 =  0 of part 




























































































duration of the fluctuations (the persistence of the shocks). In the former case a reason­
able distinction would be to identify seasonal shocks with preference shocks and cyclical 
shocks with endowment shocks. In the latter case, a natural terminology would be to 
call “seasonal” those fluctuations with a short period of oscillation (low persistence) and 
“cyclical” those fluctuations with a longer period of oscillation (high persistence). Note 
that when the period of oscillation goes to zero the fluctuations become deterministic. 
That is, when 4 ^  =  #/,,* =  0, the economy experiences a two-period deterministic cycle. 
Therefore, this second distinction allows us to analyze another basic difference of seasonal 
and cyclical variations, namely that the formers are usually thought to be deterministic 
while the latters are not.
Given this taxonomy, the results of proposition 2 may reconcile both the Friedman 
and Schwartz and Barsky and Miron positions.
If different cycles are identified with different sources of shocks (which is probably 
what Friedman and Schwartz had in mind), proposition 2 indicates that when Uu >  0, the 
response of the price level and of the nominal interest rate do depend on the source of the 
fluctuation. In this case the distinction between seasonal and cyclical shocks becomes vital 
for stabilization purposes but not for the reasons suggested by Friedman and Schwartz (p. 
295).
However, when U13 <  0, the model predicts that preference shocks will produce the 
same responses in the price level and in the nominal interest rate as endowment shocks. 
In this case, the “seasonal” and the “business” cycle in nominal variables will look alike.
If, on the other hand, the seasonal and the business cycle are identified with different 
persistence in the shocks (which is more closely related to the statistical concept employed 
by Barsky and Miron in their empirical analysis and, probably, to the idea behind Fried­
man’s quote in the introduction), then the responses of the price level and of the nominal 
interest rate to the two shocks will be identical. Proposition 2 shows that in equilibrium 
the behavior of the price level and of the nominal interest rate is independent of the per­
sistence of shocks (the entries of the ♦  matrix). In other words, two economies which are 
subject to the same source of shock but differ in their persistence are indistinguishable as 
far as price and interest rate movements are concerned. This holds in the case when both 
economies are subject to perturbations which are of stochastic nature but also when one 
economy is subject to stochastic variations while the other is subject to variations which 
are of deterministic nature.
Hence, if U13 >  0 and the “seasonal” and the “business” cycle are generated by 
different shocks, the model supports Friedman and Schwartz claims. However, if the 
“seasonal” cycle and the “business” cycle originate from the same type of shock or originate 
from two different types of shocks but t/13 <  0 , then the actual data will exhibit the 
empirical regularities discovered by Barsky and Miron.
4 Government Interm ediation
In this section I design government policies which smooth out fluctuations in the price 
level and in the nominal interest rate. I first analyze the situation when either endowment 
shocks or preference shocks affect the economy, but not both. Later in the section I 




























































































Since from proposition 2, movements in the price level and in the nominal interest rate for 
the case of preference shocks with U\s <  0 are similar to the case of endowment shocks, 
the qualitative features of smoothing policies for these two situations will be identical. 
Therefore, the analysis of this section considers only the case of endowment shocks or 
preference shocks which positively affect the marginal utility of consumption4. The policies 
of this section are stated in terms of ft
Assumption 6: ft €  [mox(^ - ^ , - l ) ;  j g j f c  1 j  t  »Yj.
Assumption 6 poses limits on the size of the government’s intermediation activities. The 
upper limit is derived by noting that since m is decreasing in ft the condition r« > 1 V( 
imposes restrictions on the size of the financiable deficit. Similarly, the lower limit follows 
from noting that if 9 becomes “too” negative, the equilibrium may not exist either because 
total return on money exceeds the return on bonds or because the sum of the monetary 
base and the face value of the government debt becomes negative.
First, I analyze the welfare properties of policies which stabilize the price level. 
Proposition 2 suggests a simple way to design such policies. Regardless of the source of 
the shocks and for a given 0, the fixed point p =  A-1  is in fact a relationship between 
p and Af* in various states and price level and money supply movements are inversely 
related. Therefore a price smoothing policy calls for negative (positive) comovements in 
the money supply when preferences (endowments) are shocked.
Proposition 3 : There exist (9h,9t) policies which make ir’ constant. These policies are 
welfare improving.
Intuitively, the policies of proposition 3 require the government to lend when xt is 
low or ct is high so that the money stock is expanded to finance the fiscal deficit and the 
lending activities. When x t is low (high) real money balances are depressed (high). By 
increasing (decreasing) the money stock when the marginal utility of real money balances 
is high (low), the monetary authority can effectively contain fluctuations in instantaneous 
utility. Similarly, when t  is high (low), real money balances are depressed (high) and the 
price level moves procyclically with preference shocks. Therefore, in order to hold the price 
level free of fluctuations, the monetary authority must undertake open market operations 
which induce positive comovements between the money stock and the shock. The welfare 
improvement comes from the fact that it is possible to choose a ir* >  AzrJ +  (1 -  A)irJ 
which is preferred by agents where 0 < A < 1 is a constant and where n} and ir} are the 
equilibrium real returns on the currency when ft, =  ft =  0.
Next, I examine the welfare properties of policies which stabilize the level of real 
money balances.
Proposition 4  ; There exist (0h,0() policies which make p ' -  1. These policies are 
welfare improving.
As in proposition 3, the stabilization of the level of real money balances requires the 
monetary authority to lend when the endowment is low or when the preference shock is 
high. Similarly, the welfare improvement comes from the fact that it is possible to choose
4In the case of preference shocks when U 13 =  0, no price or interest rate movements obtain and 




























































































a m* > \m 'h +  (1 -  A)mJ which is preferred by agents where 0 <  A < 1 is a constant and 
where mj and m ’h are the equilibrium levels of real money balances when Oh =  Ot =  0.
The policies of propositions 3 and 4 will not, in general, stabilize the nominal interest 
rate. This is because even though the return on the currency is kept free of fluctuations, 
the real rate of interest jfy -  is state dependent for i /  j  and fluctuates with the shocks. 
To put it in another way, since both shocks affect the goods and the money market, one 
instrument (the 6) is insufficient to stabilize both the price level and the nominal interest 
rate at the same time.
The next proposition analyzes the welfare implications of policies which smooth 
interest rate fluctuations.
Proposition 5 : There exist (Oh,Of) policies which stabilize the nominal interest rate. 
The policies are welfare improving.
As in proposition 3, the stabilization of the nominal interest rate requires open 
market operations that expand the supply of currency when xt is low (or ft is high). 
Therefore, by lending in those states when the nominal interest rate is higher than average 
the monetary authority can eliminate undesired fluctuations in the nominal interest rate.
The policies described in propositions 3-5 are not unique in the sense that they do 
not pin down the equilibrium value of tt*, m* or S*. In other words, there is a continuum 
of (Oh,Of) pairs, indexed by the magnitude of 7r',m* or S* chosen, which are welfare 
improving. This indeterminacy problem arises because, in general, the monetary authority 
can make a profit by continuously intermediating across states and the propositions do not 
specify how to dispose of it. In the framework we consider there are two ways of disposing 
of the profits: one is to assume that they are either redistributed to the agents in a lump 
sum fashion or returned to the fiscal authorities. This solution violates the assumption 
of exogeneity of fiscal policy. Alternatively, one could impose the long run condition that 
profits from intermediation are zero on average. In this case the policies of propositions 3-5 
are unique, in the sense that there is only one triplet (if',Oh,Of), (p',0h,Of) or (S ' ,Oh,Of) 
which simultaneously satisfies all equilibrium conditions5. Also, the exogeneity of fiscal 
policy is maintained.
Although propositions 3-5 are intuitively very similar, they differ in several respects. 
First, the policies of proposition 4 do not eliminate fluctuations in the price level. How­
ever, for p* =  1 , the conditional return on the currency is stabilized (see equation (8)). 
Therefore, the policies of proposition 4 make the expected price level constant. On the 
other hand, the policies of proposition 5 induce fluctuations in the price level, since they 
constrain the expected return on currency to match fluctuations in the real side of the 
economy (see Sims (1983)).
Second, the size of the welfare gains vary with the policy goal. An exact calculation 
of these gains is impossible to obtain here since propositions 3-5 do not pin down a unique 
equilibrium value for nt, mt , or St. However, it is possible to get an idea of qualitative 
ordering of the gains if, e.g., we consider deterministically fluctuating preference and 
endowment disturbances and chose to stabilize 7r, m, and S  at ir/,, ra*, and Sh in the 
case of endowment shocks or at ir/, mt, and St in the case of preference shocks. In
‘An alternative condition which pins down the equilibrium level of the triplets is that the 




























































































this case, stabilizing real money balances is at least as good as stabilizing the price level 
while stabilizing the price level is as least as good as stabilizing the nominal interest rate. 
This is because nominal interest rate smoothing induces price fluctuations and therefore 
fluctuations in real money balances which are of larger size than without intervention, 
while the stabilization of the price level reduces fluctuations in real money balances. Since 
risk averse agents prefer less fluctuations in real balances, the result obtains. Hence, unless 
the nominal interest rates at which to smooth is appropriately selected, the policy may 
induce welfare posts while with the policies of propositions 3 and 4 gains are insured, no 
matter what the price level is or the expected price level chosen. If one takes a conservative 
attitude regarding the welfare consequences of the policy and recognizes that there are no 
a-priori reasons to expect the government to know precisely at what level to stabilize the 
nominal interest rate, one may prefer to stabilize the price level as opposed to the nominal 
interest rate. Note that desirability of price smoothing policies is a result of the fact that 
the real interest rate fluctuates in response to both types of shocks. In an economy where 
shocks do not affect the real interest rate, for example when there are shocks to nominal 
cash balances, the above conclusion need not hold.
Third, the policies of propositions 3-5 differ in terms of the size of the market 
activities of the government unless the money demand function is linear in each state of 
the world. For example, if f/(ct,m (,£t) =  c?'m fa£?3, the size of the fluctuations in the 
government’s portfolio is smaller when the monetary authority tries to smooth real money 
balances. However, since the costs associated with managing a large government portfolio 
are not explicitly modelled in this paper, the relative size of government activities does 
not matter for the welfare of the economy.
Finally, there may also be an institutional reason to prefer price smoothing policies to 
interest smoothing policies. If the adjustment of goods markets to price changes is slower 
that the adjustment of financial markets to fluctuations in interest rates, one may prefer 
the policies of propositions 3 and 4 to reduce the transition period to a new equilibrium. 
However, since these adjustment costs are not explicitly considered in the paper, this 
difference is not crucial to rank policies.
Mankiw and Miron (1990) show that in a simple classical model where the real rate is 
predetermined with respect to monetary variables, the welfare gains obtained by stabilizing 
nominal interest rate seasonals are quantitatively negligible. Although, it is intuitively 
plausible that the welfare gains induced by stabilization policies are not large because real 
balances constitute only a small fraction of agents’ wealth, there are several aspects of their 
numerical calculations which are debatable. First, they measure the increase in welfare in 
terms of the consumer surplus under a (log) linear money demand function. If agents are 
highly risk averse, a (log) linear money demand function may be a poor approximation to 
(7) (see e.g. Dotsey and Mao (1992)) and the size of the gains is underestimated. Second, 
in their money demand function the real interest rate is not seasonal. As is argued in 
section 2, this type of money demand function emerges from the framework used in this 
paper only when preference shocks are modelled as “nominal” money demand shocks. 
Since these shocks have no impact on the marginal rate of substitution between t and 
t +  1 consumption, it is not surprising to find that the welfare costs of these seasonal 
shocks are small. In addition, because both the endowment and the “real” preference 
shocks considered here affect the real interest rate, the range of applicability of their 
calculations appears to be very narrow. Put in another way, whether the real interest rate 




























































































money is small or not. Since the empirical evidence on the behavior of the real interest 
rate in industrialized countries is slim, more work needs to be done before a measure 
of the gains of stabilization can be provided. Third, proposition 5 indicates that there 
are many levels at which the interest rate can be stabilized if appropriate open market 
operations are conducted. Mankiw and Miron choose the interest rate which is the average 
level between states but there is no apparent reason for doing so. For example, one could 
choose to stabilize the nominal interest rate at a value close to producing the satiation level 
of real balances. With a Cobb Douglas utility function, this scenario is bound to induce 
welfare gains which are larger than those reported by Mankiw and Miron. Therefore, their 
numerical calculations lack robustness and depend on the stabilization rule employed.
Next, 1 examine whether the policies of propositions 3-5 are optimal. It is easy to 
show that if the monetary authority is free from budget requirements (i.e. Dt =  0, Vt), the 
value of Bi which maximizes the discounted present value of the utility of the representative 
consumer is one which delivers the satiation level of real balances in each state of the 
economy (i.e Um, =  0, Vt). Such a policy simply requires enough lending in each state of 
the world so as to drive the return on money to the state dependent interest rate.
If, on the other hand, the monetary authority must finance a deficit and has two 
independent instruments (e.g. it can manipulate Mt and Bt independently of each other), 
the features of the optimal policy are similar in spirit to the one proposed by Abel (1987): 
select Aft so as to provide the satiation level of real balances and use Bt to satisfy the 
government budget constraint6. Also in this case, and consistent with Friedman’s (1969) 
prescription, optimality is achieved by setting the real rate of return on money equal to 
the state dependent real rate of interest.
If we restrict the monetary authority to use only one instrument to both finance the 
deficit and to maximize the discounted utility of the representative consumer subject to 
the resource constraint, the optimal policy will be of the “second best” type as in Weiss 
(1980). Maximization of (3), subject to (1), the optimal household decision (7) and the 
resource constraint leads to the following optimality condition:
PEtUjt+imt+i _  . .
f/2tm, ~  r, '
where rt =  ■ Intuitively, optimality requires a choice of 0t which sets the average
marginal rate of substitution of real balances over two subsequent periods equal to the 
inverse of the state dependent real rate of interest (the ratio of discounted marginal utility 
of consumption). Note that the weights here are given by the t and f +  1 levels of real 
money balances.
Additional insights can be gained by rewriting (11) in the following two alternative
forms:
0EtUtt+iirt _  1
U tt ~  rt(l + T)
0EtUto+iSt _  1
~  r?(l + T)
(12)
(13)
Note that in (12) the weighting factor is the expected rate of return on real balances.
6Abel’s model differs from ours in three respects: it is a finitely lived agent model, it includes 




























































































Prom equations (11)—(13) it is clear that the stabilization of the price level, of real 
money balances or of the interest rate will not achieve optimality. Such policies will simply 
sets the weights in these expressions equal to 1 and will not, in general, provide a return on 
real balances which is the same as the real rate of interest (or functions of it). Therefore, 
the provision of an optimal level of government intermediation in this model is inconsistent 
with stabilization goals. Hence, it is legitimate to wonder why has the monetary authority 
has actively pursued policies which eliminate interest rate fluctuations instead of driving 
the economy toward the constrained optimum. One possible answer to this question may 
be that setting the weighted expected return on real balances as close as possible to the 
state dependent real rate may require large amounts of lending in both states of the 
world. If lending large amounts is unfeasible, either because it violates the conditions of 
assumption 6 or because it violates the long run zero profit condition, the stabilization of 
the price level or of real balances can be seen as a second best choice which may reduce the 
“distance” of the equilibrium level of real money balances from the constrained optimum.
Finally, one should note that the policies of propositions 3-5 impose stringent con­
ditions on the actions of the monetary authority. They require constant monitoring in 
order to quickly adjust the composition of the portfolio with the state of the economy, 
knowledge of the sources of shocks and of the position of consumer optimal decision rule 
in each state in the (m, rr) or (m,S) plane. Since the monetary authority may not be able 
to identify which of the two shocks is driving the economy, I next describe a policy which 
stabilizes the price level but does not require an exact knowledge of the sources of shocks.
Proposition 6 : Assume that the monetary authority observes fluctuations in real money 
balances but does not know the origin of the shocks. Let the transition probability of the 
shocks be known to the monetary authority. Then there exist 0(m) price smoothing policies 
which are welfare improving.
The intuition behind propositions 3 and 6 is similar. The monetary authority can 
smooth out fluctuations in the price level and improve welfare by lending when real money 
balances are depressed. The major difference between the two propositions is that in 
proposition 6 the policies are conditional on the level of real balances, while in proposition 
3 price smoothing policies were designed to be contingent on the state of the economy. 
As in proposition 3, the policy is not unique. Finally, welfare improves since the policy 
reduces fluctuations in mi and risk averse agents prefer smaller to larger fluctuations in 
mt.
5 A R obustness Analysis
It is widely known that conclusions regarding the effects on the price level and on the 
nominal interest rate of shocks to the primitives of the economy may depend on the way 
money is introduced in the model (for example, LeRoy (1984, a) and Le Roy and Raymon 
(1987)). Since the way money is best incorporated in a general equilibrium model is 
still controversial, it is worthwhile to examine whether the conclusions derived in the 
previous sections survive when alternative ways of introducing money in the economy are 
considered.
Canova (1988) shows that the conclusions do survive in a cash-in-advance (CIA) 




























































































has only a transaction function, output is produced with labor and leisure enters as an 
argument of the utility function. Intuitively, the responses of the price level and of the 
nominal interest rate to various shocks are similar in the MIUF and in the above CIA model 
because, with leisure in the utility function and in an equilibrium with a binding CIA 
constraint, leisure choices directly determine the money demand function of the agents in 
the economy. Therefore the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and money 
balances in the CIA model has the same qualitative features as equation (7) (see also 
Feenstra (1986))7. In addition, as in the MIUF model, the serial correlation properties of 
the shocks do not matter for the equilibrium level of prices and interest rates. The existence 
of price (or nominal interest rate) smoothing policies which are welfare improving in this 
CIA model is then a direct extension of the conclusions that Wallace (1988) derived in a 
somewhat similar but deterministic environment8.
In an overlapping generations (OG) model where agents of each generation are iden­
tical and live two periods the situation is more complicated. First, the existence of an 
equilibrium can be shown only under a set of restrictive assumptions (see e.g. Wallace 
(1980) or Lin (1989)). Second, even for stationary environments, the equilibrium need not 
be unique (see e.g. LeRoy-Raymon (1987)).
Under restrictive assumptions which insure existence and uniqueness of the equilib­
rium, Canova (1988) shows that the price level and the nominal interest rate respond as 
in proposition 2.b) when endowments are shocked and as in proposition 2.a) if preference 
shocks affect agents’ utility in both periods of their life. When money is held for both 
transaction and storage purposes the optimal decision rule for the agents’ problem has 
the same format as equation (7). Therefore, for a given initial endowment of money and 
bonds in the hands of the old at time zero, the equilibrium is still characterized by a fixed 
point to the equation n =  0(p) and the price level and the nominal interest rate will adjust 
to equilibrate fluctuations in the supply and demand for goods. When money is held for 
storage purposes only and the money supply grows at a rate which is independent of the 
state of the economy, a similar result applies. Independently of the sources of shocks, the 
price level adjusts to maintain the goods market in equilibrium and the arbitrage condi­
tion between the return on real cash balances and on real bonds. These adjustments have 
qualitative features which are similar to those specified in proposition 2.
In these OG models the transition probabilities of the shocks do not matter for the 
equilibrium responses of the price level and the interest rates. Once again, this result 
obtains because both preference and endowment shocks affect the intertemporal marginal 
rate of substitution between consumption in the two periods of life.
The welfare implications of government intermediation depend on the specific frame­
work of analysis used. For example, if money has only a storage function, government
7Feenstra shows the general equivalence between CIA and MIUF models and conjectures that 
U \?  >  0 is a sufficient condition for obtaining a zero elasticity of substitution between real balances 
and consumption. The use of leisure in the utility function in the CIA model insures that this 
condition is satisfied. Also, the upper bound to the marginal utility of real balances in the MIUF 
model makes the money demand function qualitatively similar to the money demand function 
in the CIA model where there exists natural upper bound for real cash balances (given by the 
endowment). However, despite these similarities, the conditions required for the existence of the 
equilibrium in the two cases are different. For details see Canova (1988).
‘Wallace shows that in a deterministic CIA model there is a role for government intermediation 





























































































intermediation may smooth price (or nominal interest rate) fluctuations but alternative 
portfolio decisions may have no welfare effects (see e.g. Wallace (1981) or Chamley and 
Polemarchakis (1985)). If money is held for both transaction and storage purposes, the 
equilibria obtained under alternative government policies are, in general, noncomparable. 
This is because the stabilization of the price level (or of the nominal interest rate) is not 
necessarily preferred by old agents at time zero who live in a high endowment or low 
preference state.
The presence of heterogeneity within generations alters some of these conclusions. 
For example, in a stochastic version of the model employed by Sargent and Wallace (1982), 
it is easy to show that the serial correlation properties of the shocks matter for the equi­
librium level of prices and nominal interest rates (see Canova (1988)). In addition, if the 
government acts competitively in the open market, price and nominal interest rate smooth­
ing policies are not necessarily welfare improving since alternative government portfolios 
may induce different intertemporal opportunities for agents of the same generation9.
6 Conclusions
This paper attempts to answer the following two questions: why do monetary authorities 
choose to smooth seasonals in the price level and/or in nominal interest rates? Is it 
important for policy purposes to distinguish between seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in 
the price level and in the nominal interest rate? Using a welfare criteria it is shown that for 
a wide variety of monetary economies there are smoothing policies which improve welfare. 
Such polices require the exchange of assets in the open market, with the government 
lending when real balances are depressed, the return on the currency is low or the nominal 
interest rate is high. These policies, however, are not optimal and can be justified only if 
the absorption of the amount of lending required to achieve optimality is unfeasible at the 
current interest rate.
The paper also shows that the design of smoothing policies which are welfare im­
proving is independent of the persistence of the shocks. Therefore, if one believes that 
seasonal and cyclical disturbances are just aggregate shocks with a different markov struc­
ture, the seasonal/cyclical distinction is not critical for stabilization policies. A distinction 
which may be more useful for policy purposes is in the source of the shocks.
Finally, we argued that these results are robust to the way money is introduced in 
the model and hold both in infinitely lived and finitely lived economies. The presence 
of heterogeneity within generations however, may alter these conclusions. In such an 
environment the persistence of the shocks may be important in determining the behavior 
of the price level and of the nominal interest rate. Also, policies designed to smooth the 
price level may generate consumption allocations which are noncomparable with those 
achieved in a situation where the monetary authority follows state independent policies.
®This result differs from the one obtained by Sargent and Wallace. If the monetary authority 
rather than providing discount loans, uses only open market operations, then stabilization of the 
price level may induce fluctuations in the real interest rate. This changes the opportunity cost of 





























































































Proof of Proposition 1: The proof is similar to LeRoy (1984,b). The domain of <t>(p) 
is the clœed interval [pi,pj] and $(p) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in p. 
Therefore a solution exists and it is unique. To verify that p =  A~* is an equilibrium , it 
is sufficient to note that when p =  A-1 , V* =  Vi.
Proof of Proposition S.a: We show that for Un > 0 if p* =  1, then 0(p”) > 1. If 
p' =  1, mi, =  mi =  m so U\(x -  D ,m ,ei,) >  Ui(x — D, m, e<). Since p* is a fixed point 
Vh =  V(. Therefore 1 < and 0(p*) > 1. The proof for Un  <  0 is identical and
omitted. To examine the behavior of note that in equilibrium we have :
St = 1 -  V ( x -  D ,m t,et) = 1
( i + T « ) ( i + e ) - i (- £ r  +  0)mtrt
(A .1 )
For 6=0  and for rt > 1 Vt, it is immediate to see that if p* > (<) 1, <  (>) mj and
Sk < (>) Se.
Proof of Proposition 2.b: Omitted. See LeRoy (1984,b).
Proof of Proposition 3: Since (1) is continuous in there exists a pair
for all i=  h, l  satisfying (A.l) and
nil =  irt =  7T*
given rj. The pair is given by:
=  r r m  -  d
mi(ri — jt*(1 +  T))
(A.2)
Note that for fixed (r,, T, tt’ <  \6i\ is increasing in rm. Therefore in the case
of endowment shocks 0 > 0̂  > 6t  and in the case of preference shocks 0 >  8t >  0*. 
Finally, to show that the policy is welfare improving it is sufficient to pick tt* e [ArrJ +  (1 -  
A)*£; mint 7̂ *7 ] where it* is the solution to the problem when 6 =  0 Vi and 0 < A < 1 
is a constant.
Proof of Proposition f  : The proof is identical to proposition 3. There exists a pair 
(fl*,0t) satisfying (A.l) and
m* =  me =  m *
The pair is given by:
_  fliTm* — D  , .
m*(ri -  7r*(l +  T))
Since |0j| is increasing in 7r, for each m, 0 > 6/, >  8e in the case of an endowment shock and 
0 >  Ot >  6/i in the case of preference shocks. To show that the policy is welfare improving 
it is sufficient to notice that for any m* e [m,m], U is increasing in m in all states and 
that m =  AmJ +  (1 -  A)mj is preferred by agents for any 0 < A < 1.
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof is identical to the one of proposition 3, where in 
place of ne =  ni, =  n' we set St =  S& =  S'. The pair is given by:
6i =
S ' Tim -  £  





























































































Since \0i\ is increasing in 7r, for each m and for fixed r, and it is increasing in ri for each 
m and for fixed iri, 0 >  d/, >  in the case of an endowment shock and 0 >  61 >  0/, in 
the case of preference shocks. Welfare improves by choosing S' e [0; A(S£) +  (1 -  A(Sj[] 
where 5* is the equilibrium value of S, when 0 =  0, Vi.
Proof of Proposition 6: The proof is identical to the one of proposition 3 (except 
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